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INTRODUCTION
Contributing to this Law Review issue marking the tenth an-
niversary of the School of Law has reminded me of how quickly
time passes. It seems like only yesterday that I was in the
Bickford's Family Restaurant on Jefferson Boulevard late one
summer night after exiting Interstate 95 North on my move to
Rhode Island. A group of men approximately my age (about thirty
* Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Roger Williams
University School of Law; Research Fellow, Center for Labor and Employ-
ment Law, New York University School of Law. My thanks to Carroll Connel-
ley for his research assistance, to Samuel Estreicher for his comments on a
draft, and to my colleague, Anne Lawton, for talking me through "The Battle
of the Forms."
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years old at that time) were sitting at the table next to me en-
gaged in a rather spirited discussion. One said to the group, "You
can't beat the guy because he's got no fare." I did not understand
what the connection was between winning or losing and having or
not having fare (bus, cab, etc.), until another member of the group
agreed. "I know, he's too cool. You got him right where you want
him and he'll clear the table on you without blinking an eye. The
young ones got no fare." I pondered the exchange for a few mo-
ments and then understood. They were talking about playing pool,
and the guy they could not beat had no FEAR. That mystery
solved, I got back on the road.
That was ten years ago, and I have since made much pro-
gress. While I will never be able to swap stories with Rhode Is-
landers about the "Blizzard of 78," I know now that South County
is not a county, that Gasbarro's on Federal Hill is as good a wine
store as you can find anywhere, and I have seen the membership
on the Rhode Island Supreme Court turn over completely.
But this is not generally the stuff of law review articles.1
Rather than reflect on ten years spent at the law school and in
Rhode Island, I have decided to use this opportunity to consider a
legal development about as old as the law school - the judicial en-
forcement under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2 of mandatory
agreements 3 to arbitrate statutory claims of employment dis-
crimination. The story begins with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate /Johnson Lane Corp.,
where the Court held that executory agreements to arbitrate
claims arising under the federal Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act were generally enforceable. 4 The story will end, however,
with a look at Rhode Island law, because under the FAA agree-
ments to arbitrate must be enforced unless, under generally appli-
cable state law, "grounds... exist for the revocation" of the
1. But see Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It (S)he Will Come: Judicial
Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and "The Sex Stuff," 28 CONN. L. REv. 813
(1996).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
3. By "mandatory agreements" I mean to refer to situations where an
employer requires an applicant or incumbent to agree to arbitrate any claims
that might arise out of their employment relationship as a condition of future
employment.
4. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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arbitration agreement. 5 No court has considered the important
question whether the application of Rhode Island law would ren-
der certain arbitration agreements between an employee and an
employer unenforceable, and if so, whether Rhode Island law
would be preempted by the FAA.
One mission of the School of Law has been and will continue
to be to stimulate critical thought about the administration of jus-
tice in Rhode Island.6 I am happy to again be writing about Rhode
Island law.7
I. GILMER AND ITS PROGENY
Much has been written about Gilmer and Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams,8 the two cases that will be the focus of this section,
so my discussion will be brief. Robert Gilmer was employed by In-
terstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (Interstate) as manager of financial
services. 9 One condition of his employment was that he register as
a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange. 0
The registration application required that Gilmer arbitrate any
dispute, claim or controversy between him and Interstate arising
out of his employment or termination of employment. 1 When he
sued Interstate in federal court under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) challenging his termination, Interstate
argued that the suit was barred by the arbitration agreement. 12
The Supreme Court agreed, by a vote of 7-2, reasoning that the
FAA required enforcement of the arbitration agreement. 13
The Court explained that the FAA's primary substantive pro-
vision was passed in 1925 to "reverse the longstanding judicial
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
6. See Joseph R. Weisberger, Foreword, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. ix
(1996) (explaining how a law review can enhance the legal culture in a juris-
diction and looking forward to critical commentary on the work of the judici-
ary).
7. For my discussion of judicial selection in Rhode Island, which ap-
peared in the inaugural issue of the Law Review, see Michael J. Yelnosky,
Rhode Island's Judicial Nominating Commission: Can Reform Become Real-
ity?, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 87 (1996).
8. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
9. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 24.
13. See id. at 35.
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hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English
common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to
place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other con-
tracts."14 That provision, section 2, states:
[A] written provision in... a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract.., shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.15
Because it could not find that Congress intended in the ADEA
to preclude the waiver of a judicial forum, the Court concluded
that the FAA's "federal policy favoring arbitration" prevailed. 16
In response to the argument that the arbitration agreements
should not be enforced because there is often unequal bargaining
power between employers and employees, the Court wrote, "Mere
inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient reason to
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the em-
ployment context." 7 However, the Court distinguished "well-
supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from
the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would pro-
vide grounds for the revocation of any contract," and directed
lower courts to consider such claims.' 8
The debate about the impact of Gilmer on the enforcement of
rights created by employment law, particularly statutes prohibit-
ing discrimination, was quite intense. The Court in Gilmer had
left unresolved a huge question: Did the FAA apply to employment
contracts? 19 Section 1 of the FAA provides that "nothing contained
herein shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or in-
14. Id. at 24.
15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
16. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
19. Michael J. Yelnosky, Mediation? 53 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 901
(2004).
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terstate commerce." 20 The Court noted this exclusion in Gilmer,
but concluded that it did not apply because the arbitration clause
was in Gilmer's securities registration application, which was a
contract with the securities exchanges and not with his em-
ployer.21
The Court did not decide the question of the scope of the sec-
tion 1 exclusion for ten years (the magic number for our purposes)
when in Circuit City it held 5-4 that "[s]ection 1 exempts from
the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation work-
ers."22 Thus, the arbitration agreement Adams signed in his appli-
cation for employment at a Circuit City retail establishment was
governed by the FAA and its policy favoring arbitration. The
Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to determine the effect of
that agreement on plaintiffs discrimination lawsuit filed against
Circuit City in California state court.23
After Circuit City, employers could require employees or ap-
plicants to sign arbitration agreements with the expectation that
those agreements would be enforced if the employee later sued the
employer in court.24 The notable exception to this rule of enforce-
ability is a jurisprudence of "arbitral due process" that was and
still is being developed by the lower courts with the imprimatur of
the Supreme Court.25 One continuing battle will thus be over how
closely particular arbitral procedures must resemble formal litiga-
tion. Arbitrator selection procedures, responsibility for payment of
20. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
21. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Justice Stevens and Marshall would have
held that the FAA excluded from its coverage all contracts of employment,
and would have held that Gilmer's registration application was an employ-
ment contract. See id. at 39-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
23. Id. at 123-24.
24. In EEOC v. Waffle House the Court concluded that the EEOC could
not be barred from bringing suit in court against an employer on behalf of a
charging party or other employee, applicant or former employee who had
signed an arbitration agreement with the employer. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
Given the small number of cases brought by the EEOC each year, this ruling
did not seem to create a robust exception to the general rule of enforceability
on which an employer could rely after Circuit City.
25. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); see also
infra note 26.
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the arbitrator's fees, and the remedies available in arbitration are
examples of likely issues for dispute.26
But there is another possible obstacle to enforcement that
emerged on remand in Circuit City that is the focus of this essay:
state contract law.
II. CIRCUIT CITY AND ITS PROGENY
Recall that in Circuit City the Supreme Court remanded the
case for the Ninth Circuit to apply the FAA to the arbitration
agreement signed by Adams.27 The court of appeals had held that
the FAA did not apply to employment contracts, and the Supreme
Court reversed on that issue.28 But the court of appeals was un-
daunted. It concluded on remand that the arbitration agreement
was not enforceable because it was unconscionable under Califor-
nia law. 29
The court reasoned that under California law any contract is
unenforceable if it is both procedurally and substantively uncon-
scionable. 30 The arbitration agreement signed by Adams was pro-
cedurally unconscionable, according to the court, because it was a
26. A premise underlying the Court's decision in Gilmer was that "by
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute, it only submits to their resolution in an arbi-
tral rather than judicial forum." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Many years before, the Court had stated that "there
can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII." Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). If the arbitral forum is not
sufficiently protective of the rights being asserted by the employee, the
agreement creating that forum might be viewed as an unenforceable waiver
of the employee's substantive rights. See Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Claims, in N.Y.U. WORKING
PAPERS ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: 1998-1999, at 315-47 (Michael J.
Yelnosky ed., 2001). In fact, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph the
Court suggested, albeit outside the employment context, that an individual
who signed an agreement to arbitrate federal statutory claims might be able
to resist enforcement of the agreement by showing the arbitral procedures,
there the cost of the arbitration, precluded her from effectively vindicating
the federal statutory right. 531 U.S. 79 (2000); see also Cole v. Burns, 105
F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (suggesting that arbitral fairness requires neutral
arbitrators, more than minimal discovery, a written award, the availability of
all relief that would be available in court, and imposition of only "reasonable"
costs on plaintiff).
27. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 895-96.
30. Id. at 893-95.
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contract of adhesion, a standard form contract drafted by the
party with superior bargaining power that left Adams to either ac-
cept or reject the contract in its entirety without the power to ne-
gotiate over its terms.31 The court found the agreement was
substantively unconscionable because 1) only Adams and not Cir-
cuit City was required to arbitrate disputes with the other, 2) the
relief available in arbitration was limited compared to what Ad-
ams would have been eligible to recover in court, 3) Adams was
required to pay half the arbitrator's fees, and 4) a shorter statute
of limitations would apply in arbitration than would apply in
court.32 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.33
A. What's State Law Got to Do with It?
Does the post-Circuit City world, in which courts are asked
to determine whether particular arbitral procedures are suffi-
ciently fair, include a role for state law? Yes. Do states have the
power to decide whether it is good public policy to enforce manda-
tory agreements to arbitrate employment law claims? No. While
there is room for the application of state law to contracts that are
within the coverage of the FAA, the role of state law is limited.
1. FAA Preemption
Let's start by trying to demarcate the area reserved exclu-
sively for operation of federal law. The FAA applies to "[a] written
provision in any... contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce." 34 The Supreme Court has held that Congress intended
in the FAA to exercise its commerce power to the fullest extent. 35
Thus, only wholly intrastate contracts are unregulated by the
FAA. With respect to those contracts, few though they may be,
states can legislate as they like or create common law rules to deal
with arbitration agreements. All other contracts are regulated by
the FAA and its policy favoring arbitration.
Moreover, the FAA applies in state court as well as federal
court, requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements where ei-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 893-95.
33. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002).
34. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
35. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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ther state or federal law claims are being asserted by one of the
contracting parties. 36 The Court has held that the FAA preempts
state law "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law -
that is, to the extent that it stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."37
Thus, the Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating that a
California statute requiring judicial consideration of claims
brought under the California Franchise Investment Law was pre-
empted.38 It held in Perry v. Thomas that a California statute
requiring judicial consideration of claims for the collection of
wages under the California Labor Code was preempted.39 Finally,
it held in Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto that a Montana statute
that made arbitration clauses unenforceable unless notice that the
contract was subject to arbitration was typed in underlined capital
letters on the first page of the contract was preempted. 40
The broad scope of FAA preemption was cited by twenty-two
state attorneys general in their brief to the Supreme Court in Cir-
cuit City, who argued that application of the FAA to employment
contracts would "have the effect of nullifying most state law al-
ready in place limiting the enforceability of arbitration in the em-
ployment context and of stifling further development of state law
in this important area."41 Just as one example, Arkansas has a
statute that requires enforcement of arbitration agreements but
exempts from its coverage "employer-employee disputes." 42 That
statute would be preempted by the FAA with respect to arbitra-
tion agreements covered by section 2 because "Congress intended
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceabil-
36. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (relying in part on
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), where
the Court held that the FAA was passed pursuant to Congress's authority to
enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause).
37. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1989).
38. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
39. 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987).
40. 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
41. Brief for the State of California, et al. at 19, Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
42. Ark. Code Ann. §16-108-201 (Michie 2001); Lancaster v. West, 891
S.W.2d 357, 360 (Ark. 1995).
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ity of arbitration agreements "' 43 'In 'Circuit Clty the majority
noted this impact on state law and explained that it was partly a
product of the Southland holding that the FAA applies in state
courts, a holding that was not ripe for reconsideration.
44
2. "Arbitration Federalism"45
What role is left for state law where the arbitration agree-
ment in question "evidences a transaction involving commerce"
and is, thus, covered by the FAA? Recall that section 2 of the FAA
requires enforcement of written agreements unless a refusal to en-
force the agreement is based on "grounds as exist at law or in eq-
uity for the revocation of any contract."46 The Court has explained
that under this quoted provision of section 2, when deciding
whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate is enforceable under
the FAA, courts should apply ordinary state law contract princi-
43. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
16 (1984)). See generally Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The
Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 793 (2002) (writ-
ing that "under the FAA as currently construed.., by the Supreme Court...
it is virtually impossible for either a court or a state legislature to take the
position that an arbitration clause must meet standards of disclosure or con-
spicuousness any higher than those imposed on any other contractual term");
Henry R. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce Re-
quirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385,
400-09 (1992) (describing the wide variety of state laws that would be pre-
empted by the FAA).
44. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121-22 (2001). Sev-
eral members of the Court have expressed the opinion that Southland was
wrongly decided, and while a majority seem unwilling to overrule it because
of considerations of stare decisis, Justices Scalia and Thomas stand ready to
join three other Justices in doing so. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dob-
son, 513 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1995); Southland, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
Rehnquist, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas most recently
stated his belief that the FAA does not apply in state court in Green Tree Fi-
nancial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2411 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. This is the phrase coined by Professors Hayford and Palmiter to refer
to the principles of FAA preemption and the remaining role of state law on
the question of the enforceability of arbitration agreements. See Stephen L.
Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Com-
mercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 193 (2002).
46. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889,
895-96 (9th Cir. 2002).
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ples.4 7 However, reliance on state law is limited by the terms of
section 2.
[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is ap-
plicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the
validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts gen-
erally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning pre-
cisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue
does not comport with ... section 2.... A court may not,
then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an ar-
bitration agreement, construe that agreement in a man-
ner different from that in which it otherwise construes
nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a
court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate
as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would
be unconscionable .... 48
More specifically, only "generally applicable contract defenses
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability may be applied to in-
validate arbitration agreements without contravening section 2."49
Given the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2 of the
FAA, the structure and content of the Ninth Circuit's decision on
remand in Circuit City makes sense, even if reasonable minds
might differ as to whether the case is correctly decided. The Ninth
Circuit applied California contract law, and its generally applica-
ble doctrine of unconscionability, to hold that the arbitration
agreement between Adams and Circuit City, which was executed
47. Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 895; see First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 944 (1995). By contrast, the Court interpreted § 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000), which provides for suits in federal court
to resolve disputes involving collective bargaining agreements, as giving the
federal courts the authority to fashion a body of federal common law for in-
terpretation of those collective bargaining agreements, including their arbi-
tration provisions. State law is wholly preempted in this area. Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957). Whether this
would be the preferable reading of the FAA is a subject I hope to address in
future work.
48. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n.9; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at
281 (stating that "states may regulate contracts.., under general contract
law principles... [but may not] decide that a contract is fair enough to en-
force all its basic terms ... but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration
clause").
49. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
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and performed in California, was unenforceable. 50 The court ex-
plained that its decision did not run afoul of the FAA "[biecause
unconscionability is a defense to contracts generally and does not
single out arbitration agreements for special scrutiny .... Indeed,
the Supreme Court has specifically mentioned unconscionability
as a generally applicable contract defense that may be raised con-
sistent with § 2 of the FAA."51 Other courts have come to this con-
clusion,52 and one commentator has noted that "the arbitration
wars have brought unconscionability back to center stage."53 How-
ever, some courts have concluded that the common law doctrine of
unconscionability does not render mandatory arbitration agree-
ments in employment contracts invalid, both because of the lim-
ited scope of the unconscionability doctrine of the state whose law
governs and the preemptive force of the FAA. 54
In the final section of this essay I turn to Rhode Island law
in search of applicable state law that might lead courts to conclude
that mandatory arbitration agreements between employers and
50. See Circuit City, 279 F.3d 889.
51. Id. at 895. In a more recent decision in which the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied California's law of unconscionability to invalidate a Circuit City arbitra-
tion agreement, the court explained in more detail how it was walking the
fine line that permits invalidating arbitration agreements under state law
notwithstanding the federal policy supporting arbitration expressed in the
FAA: "The FAA... does not supplant state law governing the unconscionabil-
ity of adhesive contracts. We do not here utter a blanket rule outlawing arbi-
tration agreements in the employment context .... Moreover, under
California contract law, a court may only refuse to enforce a contract or con-
tract provision if it is both substantively and procedurally unconscionable."
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 n.10 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
also that a contract to arbitrate between an employer and employee is pre-
sumptively unconscionable if arbitration is expressly limited to claims
brought by the employee or if the claims covered by the agreement are those
likely to be brought only by the employee and not the employer).
52. See, e.g., Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002) (applying Tennessee law).
53. Knapp, supra note 43, at 794 n.120.
54. See, e.g., In re Halliburton, 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002) (holding that
arbitration agreement was not procedurally unconscionable because employ-
ers are permitted to make "take it or leave it offers" to at-will employees, and
not substantively unconscionable because there was no waiver of substantive
rights, and the arbitration procedure was fair); Martindale v. Sandvik, 800
A.2d 872 (N.J. 2002) (holding that arbitration agreement in employment ap-
plication was not unconscionable because the courts of New Jersey have held
on numerous occasions that agreements to arbitrate do not violate public pol-
icy).
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employees would not be enforceable, notwithstanding the applica-
bility of the FAA.
III. RHODE ISLAND LAW
There are at least three interesting aspects of Rhode Island
law when viewed from this vantage.
A. Simple FAA Preemption
The first serves as a simple illustration of the scope of FAA
preemption, albeit outside of the context of mandatory agreements
to arbitrate employment claims. Rhode Island has a statute that
like the FAA (with an important exception I will discuss below)
overrules the common law judicial hostility to arbitration. 55 How-
ever, in a least one instance the Rhode Island legislature passed a
statute forbidding enforcement of arbitration agreements in a spe-
cific setting - contracts between franchisors and franchisees. 56 In
1999 the First Circuit found that statute - the Rhode Island Fran-
chise Investment Act 57 - was preempted by the FAA because it
was contrary to the FAA policy of vigorously enforcing arbitration
agreements, and it was not a generally applicable contract defense
within the meaning of the FAA.58 Preemption follows from South-
land, where the Court found that the California Franchise In-
vestment Law, which made arbitration clauses in franchise
agreements unenforceable, was preempted by the FAA. 59 If Rhode
Island passed a statute making arbitration agreements between
employers and employees unenforceable, the statute would be
preempted by the FAA, except with respect to wholly intrastate
contracts or contracts of employment of transportation workers.
B. The Rhode Island Arbitration Act
The second notable aspect of Rhode Island law is the Rhode
Island Arbitration Act.60 As mentioned, it was intended to overrule
the common law judicial hostility to arbitration, but its original
55. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (2003).
56. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-14 (2003).
57. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28.1-1 to-34(2003).
58. KKW Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees 184 F.3d 42 (lst
Cir. 1999).
59. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
60. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (2003).
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version required that to be enforceable an arbitration agreement
must be "clearly written and expressed and contained in a sepa-
rate paragraph placed immediately before the testimonium clause
or the signatures of the parties."61 Application of this version of
the statute to mandatory agreements to arbitrate between em-
ployers and employees would have rendered many unenforceable,
but the statute would have been preempted by the FAA under
Casarotto because it would not place arbitration provisions on the
same footing as other contracts. 62
The provision in the Rhode Island act requiring specific
placement of the arbitration agreement was removed in 1976,63
but the act "conspicuously left unaffected the statutory mandate
that agreements to arbitrate be 'clearly written and expressed.' 64
The statute now provides, "When clearly written and expressed, a
provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a contro-
versy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract .... ,"65 The FAA re-
quires that an arbitration agreement be in writing, so the question
is whether the "clearly written and expressed" language of the
Rhode Island statute imposes an additional requirement of "con-
spicuousness" on written arbitration agreements, and if so,
whether that requirement is preempted by the FAA.
It appears the Rhode Island Supreme Court believes the stat-
ute imposes special requirements on arbitration agreements. In
Stanley-Bostich, Inc. v. Regenerative Environmental Equip-
ment Co. the court had to decide whether a buyer was bound by
the arbitration provision in a letter sent by the seller in response
61. Donahue v. Associated Indem. Corp., 227 A.2d 187, 187, 189 (R.I.
1967) (requiring strict adherence to this provision).
62. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (holding that
Montana statute requiring arbitration clause to be typed in underlined capi-
tal letters on the first page of the contract is preempted by the FAA).
63. It remains for insurance contracts: "[Iun all contracts of primary in-
surance, wherein the provision for arbitration is not placed immediately be-
fore the testimonium clause or the signature of the parties, the arbitration
procedure may be enforced at the option of the insured ... ." R.I. GEN. LAWS §
10-3-2 (2003).
64. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative Envtl. Equip. Co, 697 A.2d 323,
326 (R.I. 1997) (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (2003)).
65. R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-2 (2003).
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to a purchase order where the buyer did not sign the seller's let-
ter. 66 The court held first that retention of the letter by the buyer
without more was not sufficient to satisfy the Rhode Island Arbi-
tration Act's requirement of an "express and unequivocal agree-
ment to arbitrate."67 It also held that under the Rhode Island
Uniform Commercial Code's version of section 2-207 the arbitra-
tion provision in the letter did not become part of the contract be-
cause it materially altered the terms of the bargain. 68
The court's approach in Stanley-Bostich raises some inter-
esting issues. First, it appears that where arbitration is involved
the court requires an "express and unequivocal agreement," which
it does not require in all contract settings, and which it views as
required by the "clearly written and expressed" requirement of the
state arbitration act. Judge Lageux of the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island has read the case that way.
In A. T. Cross v. Royal Selangor, Ltd. he concluded that under
Stanley-Bostich and the Rhode Island Arbitration Act, Rhode Is-
land's generally applicable doctrine of implied-in-fact contract
could not be applied to arbitration agreements because "an arbi-
tration agreement must by clearly written and expressed...
where mutual assent is manifested in a single written docu-
ment."69
66. 697 A.2d at 324-25.
67. Id. at 327.
68. Id; see also R.I. GEN. LAwS § 6A-2-207 (1997). Under section 6A-2-
207 the confirmation letter served as an acceptance of the purchase order
even though it had terms, particularly the arbitration provision, that differed
from the terms of the purchase order. Between merchants, and both parties
were merchants in Stanley-Bostich, the arbitration provision would have be-
come a part of the contract if it did not materially alter the contract.
69. A.T. Cross v. Royal Selanger, Ltd., 217 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (D.R.I.
2002). Judge Lageux wrote that under Rhode Island law, an implied-in-fact
contract could arise where the parties conduct and communications "'evi-
denced mutual agreement with regard to the material terms that were to be
included in the final contract as well as the simultaneous mutual intention to
be bound prior to the formal execution of that contract.'" Id. (quoting Mar-
shall Contractors, Inc. v. Brown Univ., 692 A.2d 665, 669 (R.I. 1997)). How-
ever, with respect to arbitration, even if both parties had expressed a desire
to have disputes resolved through arbitration, no agreement to do so would
be enforceable unless both parties were bound to the same arbitration agree-
ment and their mutuality of obligation was objectively manifested in a writ-
ing. Id.
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If the Rhode Island Arbitration Act imposes special require-
ments for enforcement of arbitration agreements, as compared to
other contract provisions, the statute might be preempted by the
FAA. However, Stanley-Bostich and A. T. Cross do not necessar-
ily suggest that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Rhode Island Arbitration Act is on a collision course with
the FAA. First, Rhode Island law is not well-developed in this
area. Moreover, the FAA only applies, and therefore only has pre-
emptive effect, where an arbitration agreement is in writing. Both
cases could be read as simply requiring that to be enforcable un-
der Rhode Island law, arbitration agreements must be in writing,
a state law requirement that is wholly consistent with the FAA. I
am suggesting only that special rules applied to the types of writ-
ings that will suffice for arbitration agreements as opposed to
other contracts might be problematic. As the U.S. Supreme Court
said in Perry v. Thomas:
[A] state law principle that takes its meaning precisely
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does
not comport with [section] 2 [of the FAA]. A court may not
construe an arbitration agreement in a manner different
from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration
agreements. 70
70. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). I think the court's
reading of 2-207 in Stanley-Bostich was plausible and perhaps not preempted
by the FAA. My point is that further operationalizing the "suspicion of arbi-
tration" evident in the court's approach to impose requirements on the en-
forceability of arbitration contracts that are not imposed on other contracts
may be preempted by the FAA.
The analysis of courts that have disagreed with the conclusion the Rhode
Island Supreme Court reached in Stanley-Bostich - that the addition of an
arbitration clause is a material alteration of a contract under section 2-207 of
the U.C.C. - reflect a more favorable view of arbitration than that expressed
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and a view that is more consistent with
the FAA. The Rhode Island Supreme Court cited a New York Court of Ap-
peals ruling in support of its conclusion that the arbitration provision mate-
rially alters the terms of a contract. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative
Envtl. Equip. Co, 697 A.2d 323, 329 (R.I. 1997) (citing Diskin v. J.P. Stevens
& Co., 836 F.2d 47, 50-51 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Car-
nac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327 (N.Y. 1978)). In the New York case, the
court reasoned "that by agreeing to arbitrate a party waives in large part
many of his normal rights under procedural and substantive law of the
State." Marlene Indus., 45 N.Y.2d at 33-34. This is directly contrary to the
United States Supreme Court's statement in Gilmer that "by agreeing to ar-
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C. Unconscionability, Fraud and Duress
The third and final observation I want to make about Rhode
Island law is that the doctrines of unconscionability, fraud and
duress seem insufficiently robust to pose serious obstacles to the
enforcement of mandatory agreements to arbitrate employment
claims.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's statement of the test for
unconscionability places a substantial burden on a party seeking
bitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights af-
forded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral rather
than judicial forum." 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). Other courts have criti-
cized the New York approach, which seems to have been adopted in Rhode
Island, because it does not take into consideration all the costs and benefits of
arbitration in a particular case, but rather presumes that the party opposing
arbitration would suffer substantial economic hardship if forced to arbitrate.
See Bergquist Co. v. Sunroc Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1236, 1246-47 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(cataloging the following costs and benefits of arbitration in the normal
course: quicker resolutions, reduced cost, right to participate in selection of
arbitrator, arbitral expertise, loss of right to jury trial, inability to terminate
cases on motion, and limited grounds for appellate review).
But this is just a matter of disagreement over state contract law, some-
thing our federal system not only tolerates, but celebrates. While it does ap-
pear Stanley-Bostich may be based on a suspicion of arbitration that is
inconsistent with the FAA, the 10th Circuit has explained why the FAA
would not preempt the Rhode Island approach to arbitration and 2-207.
Section 2-207 is a general principle of state law controlling issues of
contract formation. As a general rule, section 2-207 proscribes bind-
ing parties to any important non-negotiated terms of contract. Pre-
sumptions against including terms, such as the New York rule, are
routinely applied to any term considered significant to the contract-
ing parties.
There is a world of difference between a state law rule that requires
special preconditions for enforcement of arbitration clauses not re-
quired for any other terms of contract ... and a rule of law that pro-
hibits enforcement of any important term of contract without the
express agreement of the parties and then concludes that arbitration
is among the group of terms considered important enough to require
such express assent ....
Avedon Engineering, Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 1997); see
also Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir.
1979) (concluding that New York's interpretation of 2-207 is not prempted by
the FAA).
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to have a contract invalidated on those grounds. According to the
court a contract is unconscionable:
only when the inequality of the bargain [is] so manifest as
to shock the judgment of a person of good sense and when
terms [are] so unreasonable that no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one hand and
no honest and fair man would accept on the other.71
Although there are few cases in Rhode Island elaborating on this
test, the First Circuit has read Rhode Island law as requiring
courts to look for both procedural unconscionability (the absence of
meaningful choice on the part of the party seeking to invalidate
the contract), and substantive unconscionability (terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other party to the contract) in
evaluating the merits of the defense.7 2 In the normal course, it
would seem that Rhode Island courts would conclude mandatory
arbitration agreements are not unconscionable.
Beginning with procedural unconscionability; on the one
hand, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has regularly held, for ex-
ample, that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion because
"an insurance policy is not a true consensual arrangement but one
that is available to the premium-paying customer on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis." 73 It has found that other "take-it-or-leave-it form
contracts" are contracts of adhesion.7 4 An arbitration provision in
an employment application, employment contract or employment
handbook has these characteristics and therefore also might be
deemed an adhesion contract under Rhode Island law.
However, under Rhode Island law an adhesion contract is not
unenforceable. If it is ambiguous, it is to be interpreted against
the drafter of the contract.75 Nevertheless, if a mandatory agree-
ment to arbitrate employment claims is an adhesion contract, the
argument that it is procedurally unconscionable is strong. If the
71. Grady v. Grady, 504 A.2d 444, 446-47 (R.I. 1986) (citing Hume v.
United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889)).
72. E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Willow Assocs., 907 F.2d 1274, 1278 (1st Cir.
1990).
73. Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co., 282 A.2d 584, 593
(R.I. 1971).
74. Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 811 (R.I. 1977)
(finding that a car lease was an adhesion contract).
75. Bush v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 448 A.2d 782, 784 (R.I. 1982).
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agreement is not "truly consensual" because it is required em-
ployment, a court applying the unconscionability doctrine could
conclude that the employee had no choice but to agree to arbitra-
tion.
On the other hand, Rhode Island continues to cling fast to the
rule of at-will employment, under which an employee without a
contract for a term may be terminated at any time for good reason,
bad reason or no reason at all.7 6 The at-will rule has been justified,
in part, because it is simply a default rule - the parties can always
agree to a different term to cover job security issues.77 Thus, one
assumption underlying the at-will rule is that employees have the
choice to accept an at-will relationship, negotiate for more job pro-
tection, or look for employment elsewhere. Individuals faced with
the decision whether to agree to arbitration as a condition of em-
ployment would, the reasoning would follow, have the same mean-
ingful choices, suggesting that agreements between employees
and employers are not ordinarily procedurally unconscionable.
Moreover, the FAA may be preemptive on the question of proce-
dural unconscionability as applied to arbitration agreements be-
tween most employees and employers. 78 The Court in Gilmer
rejected the claim that the arbitration agreement there should not
be enforced because of the inequality of bargaining power between
employees and employers: "Mere inequality in bargaining
power... is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agree-
ments are never enforceable in the employment context."79 Argua-
bly, only "well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate
resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power
that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract" can
be the basis for a decision not to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment.80
However, even if a mandatory arbitration agreement was
deemed procedurally unconscionable by a Rhode Island court, it
would ordinarily be exceedingly difficult for an employee arguing
76. See Roy v. Woonsocket Instit. for Savings, 525 A.2d 915, 917 (R.I.
1987).
77. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 947, 953-55 (1984).
78. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
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that the agreement should not be enforced to prove that it was
substantively unconscionable. For example, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court has held that a limitation of liability provision in a
contract to provide security services was not unconscionable, not-
withstanding the fact that it permitted the security service pro-
vider to limit its liability to $360 in a clear case of negligence,
where the security company had failed to program its computer to
receive signals from the alarm system it installed in plaintiffs'
jewelry store.8' The court relied on an Illinois case that evaluated
the unconscionability defense in the terms the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island has used.8 2 Allocating the risk of loss to the plaintiff
was "not a bargain 'which no man in his senses and not under de-
lusion, would make ... and which no fair and honest man would
accept."'3
Moreover, the Rhode Island legislature has passed the Rhode
Island Arbitration Act, which overrules the judicial hostility to ar-
bitration.84 Under those circumstances it would be difficult for a
court to conclude that an arbitration agreement was against the
public policy of Rhode Island.
Once again, the shadow of FAA preemption looms large. As
the Supreme Court stated in Circuit City, their FAA jurispru-
dence in this area is based on the understanding that it would be
reasonable for an employee to agree to arbitration of employment
claims.8 5
[Flor parties to employment contracts... there are real
benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions....
Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of
litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance
in employment litigation, which often involves smaller
sums of money than disputes concerning commercial con-
tracts.86
81. Ostalkiewicz v. Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563, 566 (R.I. 1997); see
also E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 907 F.2d 1274, 1278-
79 (1st Cir. 1990) (following Ostalkiewicz).
82. Ostalkiewicz, 520 A.2d at 565.
83. Id. (quoting Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Burns Electronic Secu-
rity Services, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 131, 132-33 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981)).
84. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-2 (2003).
85. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 104, 122-23 (2002).
86. Id.
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I think the FAA provides room for Rhode Island's doctrine of un-
conscionability to invalidate agreements to arbitrate entered into
by particularly vulnerable employees or agreements that so favor
the employer that they can be construed as a waiver of the em-
ployee's substantive rights created by state or federal law. How-
ever, this would not be unlike the arbitral due process approach
currently being taken by the federal courts interpreting the sub-
stantive federal law created by the FAA.87 The state law of uncon-
scionability would not stand as a unique obstacle to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements covered by the FAA.
Not surprisingly, it would be rare for fraud to be grounds for
refusing to enforce an arbitration clause in an employment con-
tract. In most cases, the applicant or incumbent employee will
simply be offered a document for signature that includes the arbi-
tration clause. While the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has
stated that an agreement to arbitrate in an employment contract
is not enforceable if the employee signatory can prove fraud in the
inducement of that agreement, the employee must show that the
employer made a false representation intended to induce the em-
ployee's reliance, and the employee must have justifiably relied on
the statement to his or her detriment.88 In cases where the em-
ployee is simply offered the arbitration provision on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, claims of fraud in the inducement will not be justi-
fied.
Finally, it is also unlikely that Rhode Island's common law
doctrine of duress would be implicated in any litigation over the
enforceability of mandatory agreements to arbitrate employment
claims. Before he became Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court, then Superior Court Judge Williams wrote that a
contract can be set aside on grounds of duress under Rhode Island
law only when a contracting party is compelled to enter into a con-
tract and deprived of the exercise of free will by the unlawful act
of another.8 9 The threat of doing what the other party has a legal
right to do is not a threat that renders a contract voidable under
87. See supra note 26 and cases cited.
88. Bjartmarz v. Pinnacle Real Estate Tax Serv., 771 A.2d 124, 127 (R.I.
2001) (quoting Travers v. Spidell, 682 A.2d 471, 472-73 (R.I. 1996)).
89. Tinney v. Tinney, No. NC98-0116, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 140, at *42
(July 30, 1999).
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the doctrine of duress. 90 In light of the at-will rule, which gives the
employer the legal right to discharge an employee for good reason,
bad reason, or no reason at all, conditioning an applicant's consid-
eration for employment or an incumbent's continued employment
on agreement to arbitrate employment claims is not undue or
unlawful pressure that can be sanctioned through application of
the doctrine of duress.
Moreover, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court has explained
in circumstances quite relevant to this discussion, duress renders
a contract voidable, and the "victim" may ratify the agreement by
failing to object promptly.91 Thus, the Court has concluded that
even assuming that a plaintiffs decision to enter into an employ-
ment contract in which he waived a statutory right to a hearing
before termination was not voluntary because his employer
threatened him with loss of employment if he did not sign the con-
tract, he could not claim duress.92 The court explained:
A party asserting duress must act promptly or be deemed
to have affirmed the conduct in question. The plaintiff
performed under the [contract] for approximately eight-
een months before contesting it .... "A party who has re-
ceived the benefit of the performance of a contract will
not be permitted to deny his or her obligations unless
paramount public interest requires it." 93
This waiver doctrine would preclude application of the doctrine of
duress in any case where the employee worked for some period be-
fore contesting the validity of the arbitration agreement.
CONCLUSION
Where are we then, in 2004, just over ten years since the
Gilmer decision? Some doctrinal issues in this area have been re-
solved. The most important is that the FAA applies to arbitration
agreements in most employment contracts. While the FAA estab-
lishes a strong presumption in favor of enforceability, one impor-
tant area needing clarification is the scope of the exceptions to this
90. Id.
91. See McGee v. Stone, 522 A.2d 211 (R.I. 1987).
92. Id. at 214-15.
93. Id. (quoting City of Warwick v. Boeng Corp., 472 A.2d 1214, 1218
(R.I. 1984)).
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general rule of enforceability that are based on defects in the arbi-
tral system created by the parties' agreement - what I have been
calling the "arbitral due process" issue. These exceptions to the
rule of enforceability are the product of interpretations of the
FAA. Under Southland these interpretations are applicable in
federal and state court to agreements covered by the FAA. Finally,
we know there is room for application of state law to arbitration
agreements covered by the FAA both in state and federal court
litigation based on state or federal law, but trying to ascertain the
appropriate role for state law is difficult indeed. I do not suspect
that we have heard the last words from the Supreme Court on
these issues. And who knows? Maybe Congress will decide that
with the 100th anniversary of the FAA approaching (2025) this
area of the law could use some revision.
